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Abstract
The International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), in its current form,
was created in 1944 by the Treaty Regarding Utilization of Waters of Colorado and
Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande. The IBWC was given the authority to manage
surface water along the US-Mexico border. Recent changes along the border have
exposed a number of weaknesses in both the 1944 Water Treaty and the IBWC, making it
difficult to resolve disputes. The challenges of administering the 1944 Water Treaty have
escalated as population continues to grow, environmental concerns increase, water
quality is jeopardized by sanitation inadequacies, groundwater resources are depleted,
and the region deals with drought. Recent drought and Mexico's water debt have
revealed vague language in the 1944 Water Treaty and its subsequent Minutes. Most
critics suggest that the current mandate, structure, and jurisdiction of the IBWC are not
adequate to handle the complexities involved with water management on the border.
Some critics of the IBWC suggest resolution could occur with a new Minute, and the
Minute system of the 1944 Water Treaty is seen by critics and supporters alike as an
avenue through which treaty reform and extensions can be legally made. An analysis of
the Minute system, and of the limitations of the institutional and political structures
surrounding the IBWC, was conducted to determine if it is indeed an adequate reform
mechanism. Even though the Minute system may be able to make treaty-compatible
reforms, other factors limit their success or even the possibility of their creation. The
Berlin Rules, the most recent and comprehensive set of customary international water law
written by the International Law Association, provide sufficient guidelines for changes
the IBWC can take. The IBWC can modernize itself through its Minute system by
utilizing the Berlin Rules and its principles that are necessary for achieving sound
binational management of an international watercourse.

I. Introduction
Water resource disputes are often difficult to resolve, even more so when the
dispute occurs across an international border. Numerous water disputes have occurred
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along the United States-Mexico border, heightened by the arid climate and recent
population growth. The 1944 Treaty Regarding Utilization of Waters of Colorado and
Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande1 (1944 Water Treaty) has solved some of the water
disputes between the U.S. and Mexico. Ongoing issues can be resolved through the
treaty's “Minute system” which enables binational water management to evolve in the
ever-changing environments of the border. The 1944 Water Treaty also gave authority to
the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) to manage the surface water
on the border.2 The Minute system allows the IBWC Commissioners to fulfill their
management functions by extending the provisions of the treaty to keep up with changing
realities along the border. Recent changes have exposed a number of weaknesses within
the 1944 Water Treaty and a lack of initiative in the IBWC making it difficult to resolve
disputes. The recent drought and Mexico's water debt reveals vague language within the
1944 Water Treaty and subsequent Minutes. Other criticisms of the IBWC suggest
resolution could occur with a new Minute.
The challenges of administering the 1944 Water Treaty on the border have
escalated as population continues to grow, environmental concerns increase, water
quality is jeopardized by sanitation inadequacies, groundwater resources are depleted,
and the region deals with drought. The border population grew to almost 12 million in
2000, an increase of about 400 percent since 1945.3 This growth demands more water
along the border not only for municipal needs but also for industrial and agricultural
needs. Growth has also resulted in more environmental problems and greater sanitation

1 Treaty Regarding Utilization of Water of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3,
1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter 1944 Water Treaty].
2 Id., at art. 2.
3 Vivienne Bennett and Lawrence A. Herzog. U.S.-Mexico Borderland Water Conflicts and Institutional
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needs. Environmental awareness has increased pressures on the IBWC that did not exist
in 1944, when the treaty was written and the mandate created. The growing population
has begun to look more and more to groundwater resources for new uses since the
surface water is completely allocated. The recent dispute arising from drought and
decreased water in Chihuahua shows that the IBWC and the 1944 Water Treaty are not
adequate for the challenges of the present and future.
The Minute system of the 1944 Water Treaty is seen by critics and supporters
alike as an avenue through which treaty reform and extensions can be legally made. An
analysis of the Minute system is needed to determine if it is an adequate reform
mechanism. A brief look at recent Minutes that went beyond technical, construction
agreements will reveal possibilities that exist within the system. The Minute systems has
not been utilized to address the numerous criticisms of the IBWC that have been revealed
over time. The criticisms can be summarized as; the internal structure, collaboration with
other border agencies, public participation, problem solving abilities, and failures of the
mandate and jurisdiction of the IBWC. Some of the criticisms point to more complex
institutional and political structures hindering the Commission which also need to be
analyzed. These include differing water law structures between the US and Mexico,
entrenched political sovereignty, a lack of collaboration and participation, and the limited
jurisdiction of the IBWC. Even though the Minute system may be able to make treatycompatible reforms, other factors may limit their success or even the possibility of their
creation. The Minute system has some successes, but it also has had a number of
failures. This inconsistency requires an analysis of the Minute system, criticisms, and
institutional and political impediments.

Change: A Commentary, 40 Natural Resources Journal, 973 (2000).
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New Minutes that actively address the criticisms of the IBWC are needed to
improve binational water management between the U.S. and Mexico. A mechanism for
change that will provide internationally recognized principles for sound binational
management is needed. The Berlin Rules may be an appropriate mechanism with specific
guidelines for the needed changes within the IBWC. The Berlin Rules are the most
recent and comprehensive set of customary international water law, written by the
International Law Association. The Berlin Rules follow the Helsinki Rules of 1966 and
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses from 19974. International water law has been a slowly evolving field.
Using the Berlin Rules, the most recent evolution of international water law, as a
guideline for the creation of Minutes may be an advantageous method to address the
failures of the IBWC as well as the institutional and political impediments. The Berlin
Rules could provide internationally recognized guidelines for the IBWC to follow in the
formation of new Minutes that will actively address its criticisms. A complete analysis of
the criticisms of the IBWC, the institutional and political structure surrounding the
IBWC, and the Minute system itself are all necessary to determine applicability of the
Berlin Rules through the Minute system to modernize the IBWC and the 1944 Water
Treaty.
II. Background
A. International Boundary and Water Commission
The International Boundary and Water Commission was created by the 1944
Water Treaty between the United States and Mexico as a continuation and expansion of

4 See generally International Law Association, Report of the Fifty -Second Conference, Helsinki, 1966;
see also UN Doc. A/RES.51/869, 21 May 1997, 36 ILM 700 (1997), Article 18 [herinafter UN
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the existing International Boundary Commission (IBC). The IBC was first set up in
1853, by the Gadsden Treaty, as a temporary joint commission charged with demarcation
of the land boundary between the U.S. and Mexico.5 The Commission surveyed and set
land markers along the border from El Paso, Texas west to the Pacific Coast. In 1889 the
IBC became a permanent agency and in 1906 the International Water Commission (IWC)
was created to administer the rules of the 1906 Convention.6 The 1944 Water Treaty,
extended authority to all boundary waters and the settlement of boundary disputes; the
IBC and IWC were combined and named the International Boundary and Water
Commission.7
The 1944 Water Treaty is very specific about many aspects of the organization
and authority of the IBWC, though not everything. The IBWC has two sections, one in
each country, that have the standing of an international body.8 The Commissioner of
both sections must be an engineer,9 though the remaining structure of each section was
left up to each country. Jurisdiction of the IBWC was limited, by Article 2, to the
“limitrophe parts of the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) and the Colorado Rivers, to the land
boundary between the two countries, and to works located within the limits of its own
country.”10 The IBWC has use preferences as a guide for resolving disputes and
managing the joint water resources as specified in Article 3 of the treaty.11

Article 3 gives the

following preferential list as a guide; “1

). Domestic and municipal uses, 2). Agriculture and stock raising, 3). Electric power, 4).

Convention].
5 International Boundary and Water Commission , The Boundary and Water Treaties, available at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/html/treaties.html.
6 The 1906 Convention for Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande
7 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 2.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id., at art. 3.
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Other industrial uses, 5 . Navigation, 6 . Fishing and hunting, 7 . Any other beneficial uses which may be determined by the

)

Commission.”12

)

)

Article 4 of the 1944 Water Treaty distributes the waters of the Rio Grande

and also includes a controversial drought clause.13 Article 4 stipulates that, “In the event
of extraordinary drought...any deficiencies existing at the end of the aforesaid five-year
cycle shall be made up in the following five-year cycle.”14 The waters of the Colorado
River are allocated in Article 10.15
“The mission of the IBWC is to apply the rights and obligations
which the Governments of the United States and Mexico assume under the
numerous boundary and water treaties and related agreements, and to do
so in a way that benefits the social and economic welfare of the peoples on
the two sides of the boundary and improves relations between the two
countries.”16
The rights and obligations of the IBWC include distribution of the waters; regulation of
allocations; conservation; operation and maintenance of international dams, reservoirs
and hydroelectric plants; protection from floods; solutions to sanitation and water quality
problems; and preservation of and demarcation of the international boundary.17 These
duties become more challenging as border issues grow more complex.
While the highly technical, engineering position of the IBWC does encourage
construction of projects to resolve some of the border problems, an integrative and
holistic approach may help the IBWC respond to border problems in a more proactive
manner.18 The IBWC has recognized this problem and has begun reforming some of its
actions in response to the changes occurring along the border, though a more structured

12
13
14
15
16

Id.
Id., at art. 4.
Id.
Id., at art. 10.
International Boundary Water Commission (IBWC), The International Boundary and Water
Commission, Its Mission, Organization and Procedures for Solution of Boundary and Water Problems,
available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/html/about_us.html.
17 Id.
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commitment is needed. Critics have identified a number of changes that need to happen
and the method through which the IBWC could achieve more successful bi-national
water management.
B. The Minute System
The 1944 Water Treaty provides the IBWC with the authority to interpret, apply
and extend the provisions of the treaty through the Minute system.19 The Minute system
is a unique system designed to allow the management agency to create legally binding
rules within the constraints of the treaty. The U.S. and Mexican sections meet weekly to
discuss water management and border issues. Some decisions between the
Commissioners are recorded as Minutes in English and Spanish. These Minutes must be
sent to each government within three days of signature by the Commissioners.20 Each
government, the Department of State of the United States and the Secretariat of Foreign
Relations of Mexico, must approve the Minute within thirty days of receiving it.21 If no
objection is found the Minute becomes a binding agreement and extension of the treaty
between the two countries.22 311 Minutes have been signed since 1944.
III. Criticisms of the International Water and Boundary Commission
Criticism of the IBWC is not new, and as the population, economics, politics, and
environment changes new criticisms arise. Most critics suggest that the current mandate,
structure, and jurisdiction of the IBWC are not adequate to handle the complexities
involved with water management on the border.23 The major criticisms can be

18
19
20
21
22
23

Steven G. Ingram, In a Twenty-First Century “Minute,” 44 Nat. Resources J. 163, 182 (2004).
1944 Water Treaty, supra note 1, at Article 25.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally Mary Kelly and Alberto Szekely, Modernizing the International Boundary and Water
Commission, Policy Paper No. 1,Univ. Of Calif. at Berkely Center for Latin American Studies, (2004);
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summarized as: the IBWC's limiting internal structure, poor collaboration with other
agencies and inadequate public participation, insufficient problem solving abilities, and
the need to change the mandate and jurisdiction of the IBWC.
A. Internal Structure
Article 2 of the 1944 Water Treaty stipulates that the Commissioners of both the
U.S. and Mexican sections, must be licensed engineers.24 This requirement limits the
IBWC to a technical bias25 and promotes the criticism that the Commission is overly
concerned with construction. It also restricts the “agency's diplomatic flexibility and
responsiveness to public constituencies.”26 A strictly technical based Commission may
not be able to handle the increasingly diplomatic requirements for water management
along the border. The Mexican section of the IBWC has a weaker engineering division,
deferring construction to Mexico's other federal agencies who already carry out these
functions.27 This leads into yet another criticism of the IBWC; the separate U.S. and
Mexican sections.28 Although the Commissioners of the two sections meet weekly,
separate offices and staffs inhibits data sharing, limits fact finding for current disputes,
and increases the imbalance of resources.29 Combining the two sections would increase
communication and collaboration in water management between the two countries.
B. Collaboration with Other Agencies and Public Participation

24
25
26

27
28

see also Stephen Mumme, Innovation and Reform in Transboundary Resource Management: A Critical
Look at the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico, 33 Nat.
Resources J. 93 (1993); see also Bennett and Herzog, supra note 3.
1944 Water Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 2.
Roberto Sanchez, Public Participation and the IBWC: Challenges and Options, 33 Nat. Resources J.
283 (1993).
Stephen Mumme, Improving Binational Water Management, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies,
University of California, San Diego, 9 (ND) available at
http://usmex.ucsd.edu/research/conf_pdfs/mumme.pdf.
Id. at 8.
Kelly and Szekely, supra note 19, at 14.
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Both sections of the IBWC have been criticized for being highly insular and
secretive.30 A lack of transparency and a failure to disclose information to the public has
resulted in a negative view of the IBWC for some stakeholders along the border. Others
along the border view the IBWC as an authority set up to protect their countries
sovereign water rights.31 Much of the problem is that the 1944 Water Treaty does not
define how the IBWC should interact with stakeholders and other border agencies or how
it should release information to the public. Because the public lacked knowledge about
the IBWC and their powers, they did not pressure the IBWC to make needed reforms.
Recently though, the IBWC has emphasized improving its public relations and public
participation.32 In 2006, the U.S. Section of the IBWC put out its 2006-2011 Strategic
Plan which includes the objective to “balance and evaluate the needs of all
stakeholders.”33 However, the Mexican section is not making similar changes. Local
communities on the Mexican side of the border often do not know what the IBWC is
planning or investigating.34 This highlights the imbalance of advances made between the
U.S. Section and the Mexican Section.
C. Problem Solving
The ad hoc problem solving is another criticism addressed in the U.S. Section
2006 Strategic Plan. The IBWC will strive to “take innovative approaches to

29 Id.
30 Stephen Mumme, Managing Acute Water Scarcity on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 39 Nat. Resources J.
149, 156 (1999).
31 Sanchez, supra note 21, at 293.
32 Stephen Mumme and Nicolas Pineda, Water Management on the U.S.-Mexico Border: Mandate
Challenges for Binational Institutions, (presentation for The Future of the U.S.-Mexico Border:
Population, Development, Water, Environmental Change and Security Program) available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1413&fuseaction=topics.documents&doc_id=19022
&group_id=15619 (2001).
33 U.S. Section, International Boundary and Water Commmission (IBWC), Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years
2006-2011, 4 (2006) available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/FY06_Strategic_Plan.pdf.
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anticipating...” border water problems.35 The agency has been accused of being highly
reactive to border problems, often waiting for political responses to issues before
reacting.36 This criticism includes the lack of proactive management of groundwater
resources and the environment as well as ad hoc management during drought conditions.
The 1944 Water Treaty does not include groundwater or ecological considerations in the
IBWC’s mandate. This has made it difficult for the agency to incorporate all aspects of
water management without explicit authority. Minute 242 does provide for mandatory
consultation on any construction that would affect groundwater.37 And though this did
bring groundwater into the realm of the IBWC, nothing more has happened to extend
authority over groundwater management. Ecological considerations have also been
largely ignored by the 1944 Water Treaty. Article 3 of the 1944 Water Treaty gives a
guideline of priorities for the IBWC and ecological concerns are not included except
under the category of “other uses.”38
A greater hydraulic understanding of groundwater and surface water connections
and a more acute concern for the environment are necessary for the IBWC to proactively
address water resource issues on the border. The recent Mexican water debt, and
difficulty for the two sections to come to a common understanding of the issues involved,
is an example of the reactive characteristic of the IBWC. The 1944 Water Treaty does
stipulate rationing rules for drought conditions but it does not include a definition of what
drought conditions are nor does it give authority to the IBWC to decide when those

34
35
36
37

Sanchez, supra note 21, at 285.
U.S. Section, supra note 29, at 4.
Mumme and Pineda, supra note 28, at 3.
International Boundary and Water Commission, Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International
Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River, Minute No. 242 (1973), available at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min242.pdf.
38 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 3.
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conditions have been met.39 The term “extraordinary drought” in the Treaty40 is severely
inadequate to assist the IBWC to determine drought conditions.
D. Mandate and Jurisdiction
The lack of groundwater, ecological needs, and defined drought management in
the 1944 Water Treaty reveals the next criticism: an outdated mandate. The water
management issues on the border have become more complex and political than the
authors of the 1944 Water Treaty could have anticipated.41 A number of critics see the
mandate of the IBWC as too narrow. Another Treaty deficiency identified is the
jurisdiction of the IBWC. The jurisdiction is limited to surface water directly on the
border. Because groundwater is excluded and surface water needs and connections go
well beyond the border area, comprehensive water management is impossible under the
current institutional framework.42
E. Suggestions: The Minute system as a Tool for Modernizing the IBWC
The criticisms of the IBWC are overwhelming, and the suggestions are not always
as comprehensive as the criticisms. Some have recommended eliminating the
requirement of an Engineer Commissioner altogether43 while others recommend
incorporating a second, non-engineer, Commissioner who is responsible for integrated
river management.44 The imbalance of resources and differences in the two sections has

39
40
41
42

Mumme and Pineda, supra note 28, at 3.
1944 Water Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 4.
Bennett and Herzog, supra note 3, at 974.
Helen Ingram and David R. White, International Boundary and Water Commission: An Institutional
Mismatch for Resolving Transboundary Water Problems, 33 Nat. Resources J. 153, 155 (1993);
Mumme, supra note 26, at 156; Sanchez, supra note 21, at 283.
43 Kelly and Szekely, supra note 19, at 3.
44 Jurgen Schmandt, Bi-National Water Issues in the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo Basin, 4 Water Policy 135,
152 (2002).
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been addressed with recommendations to combine the sections into one.45 To improve
its public participation and transparency, the IBWC could hold more public meetings,
include other agencies in the management process, maintain a transparent operation, and
make technical data available to the public.46 To solve the ad hoc response to water
problems the IBWC will need to work more closely with other agencies along the
border47 and to build up a larger database of the water resources, both surface water and
groundwater, along the border. It has also been suggested that the IBWC incorporate a
policy-based Minute to revitalize the IBWC's mandate.48 Incorporating into the treaty
new concerns and problems of ecological, groundwater, and drought management will
require the IBWC to take the initiative and create new legally binding Minutes that
further define ambiguous treaty language and extend the authority of the agency.49 The
Minute system of the 1944 Water Treaty could, most critics believe, create treaty reform
and make the management of the IBWC more effective. However, numerous political
and institutional barriers exist that slow the implementation of new Minutes as well as
the enforcement and adherence to the Minutes themselves.
IV. Criticisms of the Institutional and Political Structure
Most agree that the Minute system has allowed the 1944 Water Treaty, and its
regulating agency the IBWC, to change over time. Whether the Minute system has been
utilized to its full potential or not, however, is a matter of concern for many. Areas of
ambiguity within the treaty and the IBWC's mandate and jurisdiction leave room for

45 Kelly and Szekely, supra note 19, at 3.
46 Sanchez, supra note 21, at 292-293.
47 Stephen Mumme, Developing Treaty Compatible Watershed Management Reforms for the U.S.-Mexico
Border: The Case for Strengthening the International Boundary and Water Commission, 30 North
Carolina Journal of Int'l Law & Com. Reg., 948 (2005).
48 Ingram, supra note 18.
49 Id., at 934.
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improvement. New Minute agreements could continue to modernize and improve the binational management of water resources between the U.S. and Mexico as treaty
compatible reforms. However, “treaty-compatibility does not mean political
feasibility.”50 Political pressures and responses do play a significant role in the border
management and the IBWC's responses. Institutional structures also limit the success of
Minutes. For example, protecting sovereignty and differences in perspective in the
recent Mexican debt had direct affects on the failure of Minute 293. An analysis of the
institutional and political structures that appear to limit bi-national water management
and successful Minutes is needed.
A. Differing Perspectives
One of the political setbacks to successful Minute reforms is the difference in
perspectives and water management structures between the U.S. and Mexico. The recent
Mexican water debt conflict illustrates this point. Minute 234, passed in 1969, lays out
cycle guidelines for resolving deficit problems.51 However, the Mexican and U.S.
governments interpreted and applied Minute 234 very differently. From the U.S. Deputy
Commissioner's perspective, Carlos Marin;
“The U.S. is working with Mexico to try to adhere to Minute 234
in order to provide U.S. farmers an adequate amount of water. In
contrast, Mexico considers that in the event of continued
extraordinary drought, water deliveries required in the current
cycle under the U.S. understanding of Minute 234 can continue to
be deferred until the subsequent cycle.”52
Three more Minutes (293, 307 and 308) attempted to resolve the Mexican water debt.

50 Mumme, supra note 43, at 948.
51 International Boundary and Water Commission, Waters of the Rio Grande Allotted to the U.S. from the
Conchos, San Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido, and Salado Rivers and the Las Vacas Arroyo, Minute
243, (Dec 19, 1969), available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min234.pdf.
52 Carlos Marin, Bi-National Border Water Supply Issues from the Perspective of the IBWC, 11 U.S.-Mex.
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None of the three water debt Minutes have addressed the larger problem of differing
perspectives between the governments or even resulted in complete resolution for future
drought management.
Cooperation is also limited by the greatly varying water law systems of the U.S.
States and Mexico. U.S. States are wary of federal involvement in groundwater issues,
management changes, and even data sharing.53 However, federal involvement in State
water management is necessary for the IBWC to effectively manage the transboundary
resource. Data sharing among U.S. States has improved but stakeholders and State
officials are sensitive about protecting their sovereignty. In Mexico, water law and water
management is highly centralized creating a very different regime for the IBWC to
coordinate with local stakeholders. The Mexican States authority over water
management is limited to ensuring sustainable management and allocating water
resources in each State.
B. Political Entrenchment
Another setback is that the political feasibility of a reform are changes in political
will. The two sections of the IBWC are deeply entrenched in the “domestic
administrative and political processes of their respective governments.”54 The agencies
do not push beyond the political fences to achieve sustainable, bi-national water
management. Minute 306, initiating studies of the Colorado River Delta, did push the
IBWC into the realm of ecological considerations. However, as long as the issue remains
highly controversial, and politically hot, it is unlikely that the IBWC will take a larger
step toward prioritizing ecological uses for water without the support of government.

L.J. 36, 35-39 (2003).
53 Id., at 39.
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The IBWC, historically, has preferred not to assert its authority to adopt Minutes that
deal with sensitive issues rather it tends to wait for government initiative or a technical,
temporary solution.55
Although the Minute system of the 1944 Water Treaty has been praised for its
success in allowing treaty interpretation and extensions, the IBWC's slow diplomatic
process in creating new Minutes in response to problems has been a source of frustration
for many along the border.56 This is especially true when the IBWC is waiting for
political support, since the politics on both sides of the border continuously change and
respond to different stakeholders and different pressure groups. As a result, many
environmental groups have looked to other institutions and agreements to achieve
environmental protection and pollution mitigation along the border. The Border 2012
program of the Environmental Protection Agency and the La Paz Agreement are
examples of these cross-border institutions.57
C. Lack of Collaboration and Participation
When the IBWC was established by the 1944 Water Treaty it was one of the only
federal agencies working for binational cooperation on the U.S.-Mexico border. In 2006,
this is no longer the case. Numerous institutions exist on the border to manage binational
resources and work for greater cooperation between the two countries; Border 2012
Program, Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), North American
Development Bank (NADB), Good Neighbor Environmental Board (GNEB), and many
others. The increasing complexity of border issues requires more cooperation between

54 Mumme, supra note 43, at 948.
55 Mumme, supra note 22, at 4.
56 Id. at 35; Eileen Zorc, The Border 2012 U.S.-Mexico Environmental Program: Will a Bottom-Up
Approach Work?, 16 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 533, 536 (2004).
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the binational, national, state, tribal, and local institutions to reach sustainable responses
and plans. The various mandates of all these institutions demand “a greater degree of
formal articulation between existing agencies...”58 The IBWC is just beginning to work
with some of the other binational agencies. It is also necessary for the IBWC to direct
and distribute authority and resources to other agencies working on the border. This is
not a role the IBWC has taken.59
Another institutional problem that decreases the success of Minute reforms is the
lack of public participation in the IBWC process. Since the 1970s the IBWC has had to
work increasingly on urban supply services and sanitation problems.60 These problems
require a greater understanding of the social, political and economic dynamics along the
border which necessitates that the IBWC improve its public participation.61 Because it is
usually the public that pressures politicians and because the IBWC often waits for
political support for Minute responses to water problems, it is imperative that the public
is involved. The IBWC cannot operate as the mediator between the border and the
federal governments without public involvement.
D. Limited Jurisdiction
The limited jurisdiction of the IBWC also severely inhibits the success of
Minutes. Water management is only partially successful if it considers only a small land
unit and ignores the reality of the hydrologic cycle. The drought conditions in Mexico in
the 1980s and 90s is an example of the need to extend IBWC jurisdiction. Minute 308

57 Zorc, supra note 52, at 536.
58 Mumme, supra note 43, at 948.
59 Christopher P. Brown and Stephen Mumme, Applied and Theoretical Aspects of Binational Watershed
Councils (Consejos de Cuencas) in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, 40 Nat. Resources Journal 895, 912
(2000).
60 Sanchez, supra note 21, at 288.
61 Id., at 288-289.

16

authorized funding of irrigation improvements in the Rio Conchos Basin.62 The Rio
Conchos, in Chihuahua, flows into the Rio Grande and is included in the allocation
quantities enumerated in the 1944 Water Treaty. However it does not lie within the
IBWC jurisdiction. Minute 308 does temporarily extend jurisdiction to the IBWC, but
only for the construction of irrigation improvements. A more permanent and broad
extension of the IBWC jurisdiction is needed for successful binational management.
The numerous institutional and political barriers to resolutions along the border
seem to be the greatest hurdle in using the Minute system to modernize the IBWC and
the 1944 Water Treaty. New Minutes may modernize border water management, but
only if they can overcome the IBWC's political and institutional barriers. For now the
barriers outside the Minute system have been stronger and more limiting than the
potential achievements of the Minutes themselves.
V. Analysis of the Minute System
Minutes can create treaty based extensions, define ambiguous language, and
modernize the treaty itself. However, extensions do not equal action or the resolution of
problems. The success of a Minute can be limited by internal, IBWC, factors or external
factors. Even if a Minute is a realistic measure to use to interpret the treaty or extend
authority, other variables may not allow for the Minute system to achieve its potential. It
is important to analyze some of the Minutes that have been agreed upon to determine the
system's success. The Minutes chosen for analysis are Minutes that went beyond a
technical, construction agreement. The more technical, construction Minutes have
largely been successful while Minutes that attempt to extend IBWC authority or

62 International Boundary and Water Commission, United States Allocation of Rio Grande Waters During
the Last Year of the Current Cycle, Minute 308, (June 28, 2002), available at
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modernize the treaty have not been as productive.
A. Minute 242
In 1973 Minute 242 was passed to find a solution to the salinity problem of the
Colorado River. This Minute also extended the IBWC's authority by providing for
mandatory consultation for any construction that would affect surface water or
groundwater resources along the border.63 Salinity levels in the Colorado River had
increased drastically because of agricultural return flows from an irrigation district in
Southern Arizona. Crops in Mexico's Calexico Valley, downstream, began dying due to
the increased salt. Minute 242 set a salinity level for the Colorado River before it
crossed the border that the U.S. has been able to meet to the satisfaction of Mexico.64
The U.S. redirected the agricultural return flows that were the most obvious contributors
to the salinity in the Colorado River and built a desalting plant. The desalting plant has
never operated, other than a short test phase, because the redirected return flows have
successfully decreased salinity in the Colorado River crossing the border. The salinity
problem was solved, however groundwater impacts have largely been ignored.
The inclusion of groundwater in the mandate of the IBWC broadened the scope of
the 1944 Water Treaty by bringing groundwater into the picture for the first time. As
surface water resources are stretched thin and the population continues to grow, pressures
on groundwater are increasing. In 2000, Stephen Mumme proposed that there were at
least 18 regions with current or potential groundwater disputes on the border (see
Appendix A).65 The necessity for comprehensive, bi-national groundwater management

http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute308.pdf.
63 International Boundary and Water Commission, supra note 33.
64 Id.
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is greater now than it ever has been, and it will only become more and more essential for
the IBWC. The IBWC needs to compile complete data on the groundwater resources
along the border as well as improve, and unify, management of these resources. Minute
242 has not lead to further Minutes concerning groundwater nor has it encouraged the
two sections of the IBWC to attempt more than limited consultation. Little discussion
about groundwater management has occurred since 1973 and little has been done to
identify when consultation is necessary; both causing the agreement to have little lasting
effect on groundwater management.66
B. Minute 293, 307 and 308
In 1995 the U.S. loaned 81,000 acre-feet of water to Mexico through Minute 293
to alleviate drought stress in Northern Mexico.67 This is the first of three Minutes passed
recently that attempts to alleviate drought-related problems. Minute 293 also emphasized
the need for further data sharing and cooperation on management of the Rio Grande.
This Minute does little to solve more than an immediate water shortage in Mexico by
loaning U.S. allocated water. The Minute does not define the ambiguous term of
“extraordinary drought,” nor does it offer guidance or protocol for future drought
situations or a longer range plan for proactive drought management.68
Minute 307, signed in March 2001, attempted to ensure Mexican repayment of its
water debt by delivering 600,000 acre-feet to the U.S. by July 2001.69 This Minute goes

Groundwater on the Mexico-U.S. Border, 40 Nat. Resources Journal 341, 344 (2000).
66 Kelly and Szekely, supra note 19, at 16.
67 International Boundary and Water Commission, Emergency Cooperative Measures to Supply Municipal
Needs of Mexican Communities Located Along the Rio Grande Downstream of Amistad Dam, Minute
293, (Oct. 4, 1995) available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min293.pdf.
68 Mumme, supra note 26, at 160.
69 International Boundary and Water Commission, Partial Coverage of Allocation of the Rio Grande
Treaty Tributary Water Deficit from Fort Quitman to Falcon Dam, Minute 307, (March 16, 2001),
available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min307.pdf.
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further than Minute 293 by including a commitment to “work jointly to identify measures
of cooperation on drought management and sustainable management of this basin,”70 in
order to prevent a recurrence of the situation. However, Mexico was not able to meet the
water delivery requirements of Minute 307 and in June 2002 Minute 308 was signed,
committing Mexico to deliver 90,000 acre-feet to the U.S.71 The IBWC also recognized
the need and possibility to conserve water in Mexico to help alleviate the current water
shortages and lessen future drought deficits. Minute 308 recommended infrastructure
financing to improve irrigation efficiencies in the Rio Grande Basin in Mexico.72
Through this Minute the two sections of the IBWC indicated the will to continue to find
long-term, bi-national drought management measures. Section G of Minute 308
authorized the IBWC to set up an Advisory Council to enhance sustainable drought
management and increase the exchange of data and information.73
Although Minutes 293 and 307 do little more than meet short-term water supply
issues, Minute 308 does move the IBWC closer to agreement on longer term drought
management plans. However, Minute 308 still does not define “extraordinary drought”
nor does it improve parameters for future drought mitigation. The IBWC needs to
develop a more proactive drought response with more flexibility for water sharing and
rationing.74
C. Minute 306
In 2000 the IBWC signed its first Minute relating to ecosystem concerns beyond
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ancillary benefits from sanitation improvements. Minute 306 authorized a binational
investigation of the ecology of the Colorado River Delta.75 The binational advisory
group first met in 2003 and is concerned about water availability for ecological purposes
in the delta.76 Although Minute 306 is a very timid step toward incorporating ecology
into the jurisdiction of the IBWC, it does finally bring it into the realm of binational
water management under the 1944 Water Treaty. Water availability for ecological
purposes is a very controversial topic and politically delicate in a river system that is
already over allocated, but the IBWC has taken a tentative step without rearranging the
priority guidelines in the 1944 Water Treaty.77
D. Minute Analysis Conclusion
Although 311 Minutes have been signed since 1944, not all have achieved their
stated purpose. The successful Minutes seem to predominately be the more technical
agreements for construction of sanitation plants, reservoirs, and other infrastructure.
Small steps have been made using the Minute system to quell some of the criticisms and
enable the IBWC to address changing issues on the border. Most of these Minutes seem
to be more ad hoc responses to issues rather than proactive creations for long term
modernization. The IBWC needs to integrate Minutes that will extend its authority and
better articulate its mission. This can be done by using newly developed international
standards for water management given in the Berlin Rules.
VI. The Berlin Rules
75 International Boundary and Water Commission, Conceptual Framework for United States-Mexico
Studies for Future Recommendations Concerning the Riparian and Estuarine Ecology of the Limitrophe
Section of the Colorado River and Its Associated Delta, Minute No. 306, (Dec. 12, 2000), available at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min306.pdf.
76 Id.
77 Mumme, supra note 26, at 157.
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The Water Resources Committee of the International Law Association first
presented a compilation of international water law in 1966 at the Helsinki Conference. 78
Following the Helsinki Rules, the UN Convention of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses was adopted in 1997 and was the only other form of
international water law until the Berlin Rules in 2004.79 The Berlin Rules were
presented, at the 2004 Berlin Conference, as a comprehensive revision of the Helsinki
Rules.80 The Berlin Rules “present a comprehensive collection of all the relevant
customary international law that a water manager or a court or other legal decision maker
would have to take into account in resolving issues relating to the management of water
resources.”81 While the Berlin Rules do not yet have political endorsement, they are a
consolidated set of internationally accepted customary international water laws and
principles of international water law. “These Rules set about to provide a clear, cogent,
and coherent statement of the customary international law that applies to waters of
international drainage basins...”82
“These Rules also undertake the progressive development of the law needed to
cope with emerging problems of international or global water management for the
twenty-first century.”83 The Berlin Rules include guidelines and principles for such
factors as the international cooperation and administration between States, information
exchange, the rights of the public, importance of impact assessments, droughts, floods,
inclusion of groundwater, conjunctive management of surface waters and groundwater,

78 International Law Association, Berlin Conference (2004): Water Resources Law, available at
http://www.asil.org/ilib/WaterReport2004.pdf.
79 UN Doc, supra note 4.
80 International Law Association, supra note 78.
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protection of the aquatic environment, and sustainability. The Rules address these issues
and a number of other aspects of international water law in 73 articles (see Appendix B).
Incorporating the Berlin Rules in transboundary water management allows for
States to create a system of management for present and future issues. “The Berlin Rules
2004 appreciates and embodies the priorities of today and ventures to map the priorities
of tomorrow.”84 It is important for States participating in transboundary water
management to analyze treaties, transboundary institutions, and management policies
within the context of the Berlin Rules. As Joseph Dellapenna points out, “The Berlin
Rules speak in terms of a new paradigm of international water law that focuses on
ecological integrity, sustainability, public participation, and minimization of
environmental harm;”85 a number of the criticisms of the IBWC. An analysis of the
Berlin Rules may prove beneficial to identify solutions to the criticisms of the IBWC and
the 1944 Water Treaty.
A. Information Exchange and Cooperation
It has been noted that the separate sections of the IBWC do not collaborate
enough.86 According to Article 11 of the Berlin Rules, “States shall cooperate in good
faith in the management of waters of an international drainage basin for the mutual
benefit of the participating States.”87 Increasing active cooperation and communication
between the two sections of the IBWC would increase binational management of the
border water for “mutual benefit,” rather than sovereign protectionism and a lack of

84 Abu Raihan M. Khalid. Interlinking of Rivers Project in India and International Water Law: An
Overview, The Development. Chinese Journal of International Law. 3:553-570 (2004).
85 Joseph Dellapenna. The Berlin Rules on Water Resources: The New Paradigm for Internationl Water
Law, available at http://www.ualg.pt/5cigpa/comunicacoes/Berlin%20Rules%20Summary.doc.
86 Kelly and Szekely, supra note 19, at 14.
87 International Law Association, supra note 78, at art. 11.
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bilateral communication. The active exchange of information is imperative for the two
sections to manage their resources jointly. “Basin States shall regularly provide to other
basin States all relevant and available information on the quantity and quality of the
waters of a basin or aquifer...”88 This binational data and information exchange, though
suggested in Minute 308, has not been fully utilized as the continued drought controversy
suggests.89
In an effort to increase communication and information exchange the IBWC could
implement Article 60. This article of the Berlin Rules confirms the rights of a State to
request impact assessments and other relevant information.90 A more proactive exchange
of information and assessments between the U.S. and Mexico would help the IBWC to
carry out its binational water management mission. A similar provision to the request for
impact assessments is found in Article 18 of the UN Convention.91
B. Treaty and Political Structure: Harmonizing Laws and Use Preferences
The U.S. and Mexico have different perspectives on water management and
different laws governing management. Article 62 of the Berlin Rules suggests that
“harmonizing the laws and policies regarding the equitable use and sustainable
development of waters92...is absolutely essential if conjunctive and integrated
management are to be realized.”93 Provisions in the UN Convention support this article
and require States to cooperate toward this goal.94
Another constraint on binational water management are the use preferences

88 Id., at art. 56.
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outlined in Article 3 of the 1944 Water Treaty.95 Article 3 gives the following
preferential list as a guide; “1). Domestic and municipal uses, 2). Agriculture and stock
raising, 3). Electric power, 4). Other industrial uses, 5). Navigation, 6). Fishing and
hunting, 7). Any other beneficial uses which may be determined by the Commission.”96
However, the Berlin Rules in Article 14, suggest that “States shall first allocate waters to
satisfy vital human needs” but that “No other use or category of uses shall have an
inherent preference over any other use or category of uses.”97 The 1944 Water Treaty
places agriculture above all uses except domestic and municipal uses. This preference
guide shows very little concern for the environment.
C. Collaboration, Transparency and Stakeholder Involvement
The IBWC has been criticized for a lack of collaboration with other agencies
along the border to achieve integrated management. This has resulted in the unnecessary
duplication, as well as gaps, of functions.98 Article 6 of the Berlin Rules emphasizes the
importance of integrated management of water resources along with the management of
other boundary resources.99 The IBWC must collaborate with other border agencies
dealing with the environment, air quality, pollution, and other natural resources to avoid
unnecessary negative impacts from, and to, non-water resources and to fully achieve
sustainable management while minimizing environmental harm.100 Another process to
increase collaboration with local constituents and other border agencies is to improve
transparency and stakeholder involvement.

95 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 1, at art 3.
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The International Law Association recognizes that it is a “human right for people
who are to be affected by decisions to participate in those decisions.”101 Article 4
stipulates that the States must “take steps to assure that persons likely to be affected are
able to participate in the processes whereby decisions are made concerning the
management of waters.”102 The IBWC must begin to incorporate public participation
and transparency into its discussions and actions. Inclusion of stakeholders will move
the IBWC to more proactive management.103

Article18 also emphasizes the importance

of public participation, “...States shall assure that persons...likely to be affected by water
management decisions are able to participate, directly or indirectly, in processes by
which those decisions are made and have a reasonable opportunity to express their views
on plans, programs, projects, or activities relating to waters.”104 The commentary to this
article adds that, “...legitimacy largely depends on the consent of the governed,
and...without a sense of legitimacy, attempts to govern founder on popular resistance,
whether active or passive.”105 The Berlin Rules do recognize that States have the
discretion in structuring public participation and transparency, but that without public
access to information and public participation transboundary water management will not
be successful.
Article 18 continues on by stating that “States shall provide access to information
relevant to the management of waters without unreasonable difficulty or unreasonable
charges” including access to impact assessments.106 Access to information should also

101 Id., at art. 4 commentary.
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include education. Article 19 encourages “education at all levels to promote and
encourage understanding of the issues that arise under these Rules.” The IBWC has the
duty to apply the rules of the treaties and agreements between the two States “in a way
that benefits the social and economic welfare of the peoples...”107 The people on the
border must be actively educated about binational water management, water issues, and
the role of the Commission to inform the IBWC what will benefit their social and
economic welfare.
D. Droughts
The drought in the late 1990's in Northern Mexico increased tension between the
U.S. and Mexico over water distribution and binational management. Although Minutes
293, 307, and 308 were attempts to improve drought-related problems, these Minutes fail
to give the IBWC authority to declare imminent drought or provide for preventative
conservation measures.108 The Berlin Rules, in Article 35, address the need for States to
“cooperate in the management of waters to prevent, control, or mitigate droughts.”109
The Rules define cooperation with respect to drought prevention and control to include:
“an integrated strategy for addressing the physical, biological, and socioeconomic aspects of the drought; the definition of criteria that activate
the provisions of this Article; an integrated strategy for mitigating the
effects of drought and moving towards the sustainable use of waters; the
development or strengthening necessary legislation and appropriate
institutions for achieving these goals; and the allocation of adequate
resources to achieve these goals...”110
The IBWC must work on preventative measures for dealing with future drought to lessen
the negative impacts and tensions between the countries. The two sections of the IBWC

107 International Boundary and Water Commission, supra note 16.
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should communicate prior to a drought situation to create the necessary strategies for
proactive management of the water resources. Definition of the term “extraordinary
drought” in the 1944 Water Treaty would further enable the IBWC to take the necessary
steps when these drought conditions are met.111
E. Conjunctive Management and Groundwater
In 1983 Minute 242 was the first, and last, agreement addressing groundwater
management between the two sections of the IBWC. Minute 242 authorized mandatory
consultation on any construction that would impact surface or groundwater resources.112
However, the Minute has lead to “negligible progress towards sustainable management
of transboundary groundwater aquifers.”113 Article 5 of the Berlin Rules emphasizes
“States shall use their best efforts to manage surface waters, groundwater, and other
pertinent waters in a unified and comprehensive manner.”114 The mandatory consultation
given in Minute 242 falls short of “unified and comprehensive” management stressed in
Article 5 of the Berlin Rules.115 Article 37 also reiterates the importance of managing
“groundwater conjunctively with the surface waters...taking into account any
interconnections between aquifers or between an aquifer and a body of surface water.”116
The two States have continued to protect their sovereign right to pump as much of their
border aquifers as possible while informing the other of groundwater development.117
The importance of conjunctive management of surface waters and groundwater is
indispensable to effective, sustainable management of the resources.
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Further guidelines are given in Articles 38-42 for sustainable, transboundary
groundwater management. Article 38 requires States to “take early action and develop
long-term plans to ensure the sustainable use of groundwater.”118 Mandatory
consultation of sovereign actions does not lead to developing a binational, long-term plan
for use of groundwater. The lack of binational groundwater management, along with a
lack of complete knowledge of the groundwater resources on the border, “contribute to
user uncertainty and, in turn, strengthen the incentives to deplete the resource.”119
Article 40 takes into account the importance of sustainability for managing aquifers.120
“In order to assure sustainability, States will have to establish a maximum allowable
drawdown for each aquifer.”121 Sustainability, or a maximum drawdown, cannot be
established without more complete data about the transboundary aquifers, transparent
information exchanges of aquifer withdrawals by each State, and the development of a
long-term, binational management plan. Article 42 gives guidelines for attaining this
sustainable management of groundwater resources.122 States shall “manage an aquifer in
its entirety,”123 “consult and exchange information and data,”124 “cooperate in the
collection and analyzing additional needed information,”125 “set drawdown rates in order
to assure the equitable utilization of the waters,”126 “cooperate in managing the recharge
of the aquifer,”127 and “refrain from and prevent acts or omissions within their territory
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that cause significant harm to another basin State.”128
F. Sustainability, Environment, and Ecology
Sustainability, according to the Berlin Rules, must apply to all transboundary
waters, surface water and groundwater. Article 7 says that “States shall take all
appropriate measures to manage waters sustainability.”129 The Rules continue to advise
that sustainability usually needs both integrated management (Article 6) and conjunctive
management (Article 5).130 “Determining sustainability must remain a highly factspecific analysis of the proper uses of a particular resource in a particular setting.”131 In
this manner all of the Rules should be followed to achieve sustainable management on
the US-Mexico border.
The 1944 Water Treaty relegates environmental and ecological concerns to last
place on its list of use preferences, under “any other beneficial uses.”132 In contrast, the
Berlin Rules propose that “States shall take all appropriate measures to prevent or
minimize environmental harm.”133 The IBWC has repeatedly been criticized for failing
to address or include ecological and environmental concerns in their management.134
Minute 306 was a small advancement for the IBWC and did authorize a binational study
of the ecology of the Colorado River Delta.135 This timid Minute does not come close to
fulfilling Article 22 of the Berlin Rules; “States shall take all appropriate measures to
protect the ecological integrity necessary to sustain ecosystems dependent on particular
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waters.”136 It is evident by the decrease in size of the Colorado River Delta, now less
than one tenth its original size,137 and the increase of endangered species that the IBWC
has not always taken measures to protect the integrity of the ecosystem.
The Berlin Rules also include an obligation to assess environmental impacts by
monitoring programs, projects, and activities that may harm the river ecosystems in
Article 29.138 “Impacts to be assessed include, among others: effects on human health
and safety; effects on the environment; effects on existing or prospective economic
activity; effects on cultural or socio-economic conditions; and effects on the
sustainability of the use of waters.”139 Following the Berlin Rules, the IBWC would
need to incorporate environmental and sustainability effects into assessments along side
the human and economic impacts. Further, the IBWC would need to carry out on-going
assessments of all these impacts to achieve sound and sustainable environmental
management.140
VII. Minutes Required to Implement the Berlin Rules
Minutes can be created to incorporate all of the various aspects of the Berlin Rules
that are missing from the 1944 Water Treaty and authority of the IBWC. Some of the
Minutes would be very difficult, such as a Minute altering of the use preferences and
elevating ecological and environmental uses. Changing the language of the 1944 Water
Treaty may be impossible. However, the actions of the IBWC can incorporate new ideas
and guidelines within the constraints of the 1944 Water Treaty. In other cases, a Minute
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may not be necessary for the IBWC to adhere more closely to the Berlin Rules. This may
be the case for following Article 6 on integrated management. The IBWC has made
progress collaborating with other agencies along the border.141
A number of Minutes could be agreed upon by the two sections of the IBWC to
help modernize and extend authority of the Commission. A Minute incorporating Article
11, “States shall cooperate...for mutual benefit,”142 of the Berlin Rules along with Article
60, “requests for impact assessments or other information,”143 would set up a formal stepby-step process for both sections and ensure full communication and collaboration
between the States. The U.S. section of the IBWC has taken the initiative to form
strategic plans that enables the Mexican section and stakeholders to see a long-term plan
of action.144 A new Minute supporting collaboration between the sections of the IBWC
could require a binational strategic plan, which would also benefit stakeholders.
Another Minute should agree to guidelines and requirements for transparency and
stakeholder involvement by integrating Article 4, 18, and 19. Article 4 sets the priority
that “persons likely to be affected are able to participate in the process..,”145 while Article
18 requires States to “provide access to information relevant,” including impact
assessments,146 and Article 19 requires the promotion of education.147 The Minute should
give explicit guidelines for the IBWC to follow while increasing public participation.
The U.S. section of the IBWC emphasized the need to “balance and evaluate the needs of
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all stakeholders”148 in its most recent Strategic Plan.
The ongoing drought conflict between the two States, despite Minutes on the
issue, is evidence that the current drought strategies are not working. A Minute adhering
to the rules of Article 35; “to prevent, control, or mitigate droughts” by cooperation
between States for “an integrated strategy, definition of criteria, development or
strengthening necessary legislation, and allocation of adequate resources;”149 would assist
the IBWC in dealing with drought situations in a proactive and cooperative manner. The
Minute would need to create cooperation between the States on integrated strategies,
long-term planning, definition of “extraordinary drought,” prompt communication when
the situation arises, and allocation of resources during drought.150 The IBWC would also
need to step beyond protectionist attitudes and push for stronger support of drought
mitigation and cooperation at the federal and local levels.
The IBWC should agree on a Minute that would encourage conjunctive
management of surface waters and groundwater such as Articles 5 and 37 advise.151
Including ideas from Article 38, to “take early action and develop long-term plans to
ensure the sustainable use of groundwaters,”152 would assist the IBWC to broaden its
jurisdiction and secure future groundwater supplies. This Minute could also contain
guidelines from Articles 40, 41 and 42 to establish specific guidelines for the sustainable
management and protection of the aquifers.153
And finally, building on Minute 306, a Minute is needed to protect ecosystems
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along the border by incorporating Article 7 and 22. The need for an ecological Minute
has been voiced by many critics.154 A Minute requiring States “take all appropriate
measures to protect the ecological integrity necessary to sustain ecosystems...”155 would
strengthen the IBWC's authority and take the necessary precautions for sustainable water
management. This would include incorporating the impacts of projects and programs on
the environment and on the sustainability of water resources in impact assessments.156
By incorporating “new principles of international law in addition to emphasizing
well-settled international principles...” the IBWC can modernize itself and resolve a
number of the recent criticisms.157 While it is apparent that there are a number of
institutional and political barriers to the implementation and enforcement of Minutes,
formal Minutes can strengthen the IBWC and binational water management.
The IBWC must become a more assertive border institution, pushing for the political
changes rather than being pulled by them.
VIII. Evaluation
The Berlin Rules can serve as guidelines for the IBWC to incorporate modern
customary international water law. “The Rules presented here present a comprehensive
collection of all the relevant customary international law that a water manager or a court
or other legal decision maker would have to take into account in resolving issues relating
to the management of water resources.”158 Adherence to the Berlin Rules would enable
the IBWC to create a more collaborative, transparent, participatory, proactive and
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modern institution to manage the binational water resources between the U.S. and
Mexico.
Minutes do successfully interpret treaty language, extend authority and modernize
a treaty. The 1944 Water Treaty and the IBWC have the potential to improve binational
water management through the Minute system. However, institutional inadequacies and
limited political leadership restrict the success of Minutes and the creation of more
progressive Minutes. The IBWC's entrenchment in the political process and responses,
lack of coordination with other agencies and the public, limited jurisdiction, and the
differences in government perspectives and water law structures have made
modernization of the 1944 Water Treaty very difficult. It seems that all of these factors
are limiting the Minute system, but also, it is imperative that each of these factors is
resolved. This can be done through the Minute system. Minutes incorporating ideas and
guidelines from the Berlin Rules, as discussed above, would address most of the
inadequacies and failures of the IBWC.
The IBWC, through incremental changes over time, can modernize itself by
turning planning goals, that incorporate guidelines from the Berlin Rules, into formal
Minutes. Utilizing Strategic Plans from both sections, the IBWC can take issues that are
recognized as important aspects of improvement and move them from an informal level
into a formal agreement. This would require full cooperation and coordination for both
sections. The 2006 Strategic Plan of the US IBWC recognizes the importance of
stakeholders' interests, expectations, and role in the mission of the IBWC.159 Strategic
Objective 4.3, Stakeholder Outreach and Response, could easily be turned into a Minute
in which both sections of the IBWC would agree to “strive to keep the general public and
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its stakeholders informed of all its plans and on-going activities.”160 The goal goes
further by identifying that the agency will hold public meetings in various regions to
ensure the achievement of outreach and response.161 For the IBWC to turn this sort of
informal goal into a formal agreement between the two sections would be manageable,
especially when using the Berlin Rules as guidelines. The Strategic Plans are usually, in
part, responses to political pressures and criticisms. The US Commissioner stated that,
“Our commitment through strategic planning is not only to conform with the law but also
to the spirit of improving program performance and being accountable to our
stakeholders.”162 The inclusion of the Berlin Rules in planning strategies, and then
formal Minute agreements, would enable the IBWC to overcome political and
institutional hurdles and make significant changes that still adhere to customary
international water law.

Criticisms

Impacts

Internal Structure / Problem
Solving

Overly technical, sovereign
protectionism, retroactive
responses, lack of integrated
management.

Berlin Rules
Articles 3, 11, 14, 60, 62

Collaboration with other Agencies

Unnecessary duplication of and
gaps in border management.

Public Participation /
Transparency

Negative view and lack of trust in
the IBWC as well as lack of
pressure from stakeholders.

Articles 4, 18, 19

Lack of groundwater and
environmental concerns and
inadequacies of drought
management.

Articles 5, 6, 7, 22, 29, 35,
37, 38, 40, 42

Mandate / Jurisdiction

Articles 4, 6, 18

159 U.S. Section, International Boundary and Water Commission, supra note 29, at 4.
160 Id., at 20.
161 Id.
162 Id., in “A Message to Stakeholders.”
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VII. Conclusion
The IBWC is limited by entrenchment in the political processes, differing water
law structures, a lack of coordination with other agencies and public participation,
restricted jurisdiction, limited proactive management, and a lack of an assertive political
posture. As so many critics suggest, most of these problems could be resolved by the
Minute system. However, there are numerous institutional and political problems the
IBWC must overcome before the Minute system can successfully achieve resolution.
Minutes have failed, not because the system itself is flawed, but because of the internal
and external problems surrounding the Minute system. The Berlin Rules do contain
principles that are necessary for achieving sound binational management of an
international watercourse. The IBWC and the 1944 Water Treaty follow some of the
principle obligations concerning an international watercourse stated in the Berlin Rules,
but there are a number of guidelines the IBWC should incorporate. The 1944 Water
Treaty continues to hold to the allocation regime of 1944, however there are many
political barriers that would not allow a change to this regime. The IBWC can step into
21st Century water management by utilizing the Berlin Rules and by turning the informal
goals of the Strategic Plans of the IBWC and CILA into legally binding Minutes. This
approach would allow for both sections to identify needed goals and then approach
discussion and negotiation to reach a formal agreement. A modernization is possible if
the Minute system is fully utilized. The greatest barrier to this will continue to be
external political pressures.
The Good Neighbor Environmental Board made a number of recommendations
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for the management of water resources in its Eighth Report to the President and Congress
of the United States including: “Clarify current responsibilities held by the U.S.-Mexico
border-region institutions responsible for managing its water resources. Identify
jurisdictional gaps and overlaps, interpret missions to reflect changing circumstances,
and leverage opportunities for stronger cross-institutional collaboration.”163 The Good
Neighbor Environmental Board also suggested that the U.S. and Mexico develop and
sign an agreement about water resources data which should support collection, analysis,
sharing, and collaboration of data to increase binational water management.164 Along
with clarification of responsibilities, identification of jurisdiction, interpretation of
mission, and data sharing the report emphasized the importance of public participation in
border resource management. “Using a stakeholder-driven watershed approach, will
enable the IBWC to address immediate concerns in critical areas while pursuing
collaborative longer-term strategies.”165

163 Good Neighbor Environmental Board, Fifth Report of the Good Neighbor Environmental Board to the
President and Congress of the United States, December 2001,
http://www.epa.gov/ocem/gneb/pdf/english2001gneb.pdf.
164 Id.
165 Id.
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Article 4
Participation by Persons
States shall take steps to assure that persons likely to be affected are able to participate in the
processes whereby decisions are made concerning the management of waters.

Article 5
Conjunctive Management
States shall use their best efforts to manage surface waters, groundwater, and other pertinent
waters in a unified and comprehensive manner.

Article 6
Integrated Management
States shall use their best efforts to integrate appropriately the management of waters with the
management of other resources.

Article 7
Sustainability
States shall take all appropriate measures to manage waters sustainably.

Article 8
Minimization of Environmental Harm
States shall take all appropriate measures to prevent or minimize environmental harm.

Article 11
Cooperation
Basin States shall cooperate in good faith in the management of waters of an international
drainage basin for the mutual benefit of the participating States.

Article 14
Preferences among Uses
1. In determining an equitable and reasonable use, States shall first allocate waters to satisfy
vital human needs.
2. No other use or category of uses shall have an inherent preference over any other use
or category of uses.
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Article 18
Public Participation and Access to Information
1. In the management of waters, States shall assure that persons subject to the State’s jurisdiction and likely to be affected by water management decisions are able to participate,
directly or indirectly, in processes by which those decisions are made and have a reasonable opportunity to express their views on programs, plans, projects, or activities relating
to waters.
2. In order to enable such participation, States shall provide access to information relevant to
the management of waters without unreasonable difficulty or unreasonable charges.
3. The information subject to access under this Article includes, without being limited to,
impact assessments relating to the management of waters.
4. In providing information consistently with this Article, States need not provide access to
information that would compromise:
a. Intellectual property rights, including commercial or industrial secrets;
b. Rights of individual privacy;
c. Criminal investigations or trials;
d. National security; and
e. Information that could endanger ecosystems, historic sites, and other naturally or
culturally important objects or locations.

Article 19
Education
States shall undertake education at all levels to promote and encourage understanding of the
issues that arise under these Rules.

Article 22
Ecological Integrity
States shall take all appropriate measures to protect the ecological integrity necessary to
sustain ecosystems dependent on particular waters.

Article 29
The Obligation to Assess Environmental Impacts
1. States shall undertake prior and continuing assessment of the impact of programs,
projects, or activities that may have a significant effect on the aquatic environment or
the sustainable development of waters.
2. Impacts to be assessed include, among others:
a. Effects on human health and safety;
b. Effects on the environment;
c. Effects on existing or prospective economic activity;
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d. Effects on cultural or socio-economic conditions; and
e. Effects on the sustainability of the use of waters.

Article 31
The Impact Assessment Process
Assessment of the impacts of any program, project, or activity shall include, among others:
a. Assessment of the waters and the environments likely to be affected;
b. Description of the proposed activity and its likely effects, with particular emphasis on any
transboundary effects;
c. Identification of ecosystems likely to affected, including an assessment of the living and nonliving resources of the relevant water basin or basins;
d. Description of mitigation measures appropriate to minimize environmental harm;
e. Appraisal of the institutional arrangements and facilities in the relevant drainage basin or
basins;
f. Assessment of the sources and levels of pollutants in the relevant drainage basin or basins,
and of their effects on human health, ecological integrity, and amenities;
g. Identification of human activities that are likely to be affected;
h. Explanation of predictive methods and underlying assumptions as well as the relevant data
used, including identification of gaps in knowledge and uncertainties encountered in
compiling the required information, including assessment of the risk of major accidents;
i. Where appropriate, an outline for monitoring and management programs and plans for
post-project analysis;
j. A statement of the reasonable alternatives, including a non-action alternative; and
k. An adequate non-technical summary.

Article 35
Droughts
1. States shall cooperate in the management of waters to prevent, control, or mitigate
droughts, having due regard to the interests of other basin States.
2. Cooperation with respect to drought shall, by agreement between affected States and
when appropriate with international organizations, include among other matters:
a. An integrated strategy for addressing the physical, biological, and socio-economic
aspects of the drought;
b. The definition of criteria that activate the provisions of this Article;
c. An integrated strategy for mitigating the effects of drought and moving towards the
sustainable use of waters;
d. The development or strengthening necessary legislation and appropriate institutions for
achieving these goals; and
e. The allocation of adequate resources to achieve these goals in accordance with their
circumstances and capabilities.
3. States likely to be affected by drought shall promptly communicate among themselves and
with competent international organizations whenever the criteria specified pursuant to
paragraph 2(b) are met.

44

4.

Nothing in this Article limits the rights of States to protect themselves unilaterally
from the effects of droughts so long as the measures taken do not violate
obligations under these Rules or otherwise violate the rights of other States.

Article 37
Managing Aquifers Generally
States shall manage groundwater conjunctively with the surface waters of any basin of which
it is a part, taking into account any interconnections between aquifers or between and an aquifer and a body of surface water, as well as any impact on aquifers caused by activities within
the State’s jurisdiction or control.

Article 38
Precautionary Management of Aquifers
States, in accordance with the precautionary approach, shall take early action and develop
long-term plans to ensure the sustainable use of groundwater and of the aquifers in which the
groundwater is contained.

Article 40
Sustainability Applied to Groundwater
1. States shall give effect to the principle of sustainability in managing aquifers, taking into
account natural and artificial recharge.
2.

The rule in paragraph 1 does not preclude the withdrawal of groundwater from
an aqui-fer that is receiving no significant contemporary recharge.

Article 42
Transboundary Aquifers
1. The Rules applicable to internationally shared waters apply to an aquifer if:
a. It is connected to surface waters that are part of an international drainage basin; or
b. It is intersected by the boundaries between two or more States even without a connection to surface waters that form an international drainage basin.

2. Whenever possible and appropriate, basin States sharing an aquifer referred to in
para-graph 1 shall manage an aquifer in its entirety.
3. In managing the waters of an aquifer referred to in paragraph 1, basin States shall
consult and exchange information and data at the request of any one of them and shall
cooperate in the collection and analyzing additional needed information pertinent to the
obligations under these Rules.
4. Basin States shall cooperate according to the procedures in Chapter XI to set
drawdown rates in order to assure the equitable utilization of the waters of an aquifer
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referred in paragraph 1, having due regard for the obligation not to cause significant
harm to other basin States and to the obligation to protect the aquifer.
5. Basin States sharing an aquifer referred to in paragraph 1 shall cooperate in managing
the recharge of the aquifer.
6. Basin States sharing an aquifer referred to in paragraph 1 shall refrain from and
prevent acts or omissions within their territory that cause significant harm to another
basin State, having due regard to the right of each basin State to make equitable and
reasonable use of the waters.

Article 60
Requests for Impact Assessments or Other Information
1. A basin State, at the request of another basin State likely to be affected by a program, plan,
project, or activity envisaged to occur or occurring within the requested State, shall
undertake an impact assessment of the program, plan, project, or activity on an ongoing
basis.
2. A basin States, at the request of another basin State likely to be affected by a program,
project, or activity envisaged to occur within the requested State, shall provide all
relevant information in the requested State’s possession or which the requested State can
acquire through reasonable efforts, limited as in Article 56(2).
3. A basin State requested by another basin State to provide information or to conduct an
impact assessment pursuant to this Article shall employ its best efforts to comply with the
request but may condition its compliance upon reciprocal exchanges by the requesting
State or upon reimbursement for the reasonable costs of collecting and processing the
information.

Article 62
Harmonization of National Laws and Policies
In enacting national laws pursuant to this Article, basin States shall consult other
interested States with a view to harmonize the laws and policies regarding the
equitable use and sustainable development of waters and of the aquatic
environment.
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Glossary of Terms
Ad Hoc – A solution that has one specific purpose with connotations for inadequate
planning and responses.
Beneficial Use – A term used in U.S. Western water law to emphasize that the use of
water must be 'beneficial' or it is considered waste. Each state defines or does not define
what constitutes a beneficial use.
Berlin Rules – Customary international water law principles and guidelines written by
the Water Resources Committee of the International Law Association in 2004.
Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) – Established in 1993 to
identify and fund environmental infrastructure projects along the U.S.-Mexico border.
Border 2012 Program – A binational environmental program for the U.S.-Mexico
border implemented by the La Paz Agreement.
Customary International Water Law – Water law that has arisen from a majority
acceptance and adherence to particulars laws.
Comision Internacional de Limites Y Aguas (CILA) – The Mexican section of the
International Boundary and Water Commission. (See below, International Boundary and
Water Commission).
Gadsden Treaty – International treaty between the U.S. and Mexico to demarcate the
land boundary between the U.S. and Mexico in 1853.
Good Neighbor Environmental Board (GNEB) – An advisory council set up to advise
the President and Congress of the U.S. about environmental infrastructure needs on the
U.S.-Mexico border.
Helsinki Rules – Customary international water law principles and guidelines written by
the International Law Association in 1966.
International Boundary Commission (IBC) – A temporary joint commission set up by
the 1853 Gadsden Treaty to demarcate the U.S.-Mexico border.
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) – The binational
commission set up by the 1944 Water Treaty between the U.S. and Mexico to manage the
waters along the international boundary. (Mexican counterpart: Comision Internacional
de Limites Y Aguas, CILA).
International Water Commission (IWC) – A permanent agency set up to administer
the rules of the 1906 Convention.
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International Law Association – A worldwide organization set up to study and clarify
public and private international law.
La Paz Agreement – An agreement signed in 1983 between the U.S. and Mexico
concerning the environment on the border. The agreement set up the Border 2012
Program.
Limotrophe Section – The reach of the rivers that creates the international boundary
between the U.S. and Mexico.
Mandate – An obligation given by a government body.
Minutes – Legally binding extensions between the IBWC and CILA.
North American Development Bank (NADB) – A binational financial institution
governed by the U.S. and Mexico to finance environmental projects.
Sustainability (Berlin Rules definition) - “The integrated management of resources to
assure efficient use of and equitable access to waters for the benefit of current and future
generations while preserving renewable resources and maintaining non-renewable
resources to the maximum extent reasonably possible.”166
UN Convention – The UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses codifies customary international water law by the UN General Assembly in
1997.
Use Preferences – An order of uses to serve as a guide for preferential attention.
1906 Convention – Provides for distribution of the Rio Grande between the U.S. and
Mexico.
1944 Treaty Regarding Utilization of Waters of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of
the Rio Grande (1944 Water Treaty) – An international treaty between the U.S. and
Mexico that established the IBWC and binational water management.

166

International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-Second Conference, Helsinki, 1966.

48

Bibliography
Bennett, Vivienne and Lawrence A. Herzog. U.S.-Mexico Borderland Water Conflicts
and Institutional Change: A Commentary, 40 Natural Resources Journal, 973 (2000).
Brown, Christopher P. and Stephen Mumme. Applied and Theoretical Aspects of
Binational Watershed Councils (Consejos de Cuencas) in the U.S.-Mexico
Borderlands, 40 Nat. Resources Journal 895 (2000).
Dellapenna, Joseph. The Berlin Rules on Water Resources: The New Paradigm for
International Water Law, available at
http://www.ualg.pt/5cigpa/comunicacoes/Berlin%20Rules%20Summary.doc.
Environmental Defense. Once a Mighty Delta: History, March 2003, available at
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/article.cfm?ContentID=2642.
Good Neighbor Environmental Board, Fifth Report of the Good Neighbor Environmental
Board to the President and Congress of the United States, December 2001, available
at http://www.epa.gov/ocem/gneb/pdf/english2001gneb.pdf.
Ingram, Helen and David R. White, International Boundary and Water Commission:An
Institutional Mismatch for Resolving Transboundary Water Problems, 33 Nat.
Reasources J. 153 (1993).
Ingram, Steven G. In a Twenty-First Centure “Minute,” 44 Natural Resources Journal
163, 182 (2004).
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), The Boundary and Water
Treaties, available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/html/treaties.html.
International Boundary Water Commission (IBWC), The International Boundary and
Water Commission, Its Mission, Organization and Procedures for Solution of
Boundary and Water Problems, available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/html/about_us.html
International Boundary and Water Commission, Waters of the Rio Grande Allotted to the
U.S. from the Conchos, San Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido, and Salado Rivers and
the Las Vacas Arroyo, Minute 243, (Dec 19, 1969), available at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min234.pdf.
International Boundary and Water Commission, Permanent and Definitive Solution to the
International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River, Minute No. 242 (1973),
available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min242.pdf.
International Boundary and Water Commission, Emergency Cooperative Measures to
Supply Municipal Needs of Mexican Communities Located Along the Rio Grande
Downstream of Amistad Dam, Minute 293, (Oct. 4, 1995) available at

49

http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min293.pdf.

International Boundary and Water Commission, Conceptual Framework for United
States-Mexico Studies for Future Recommendations Concerning the Riparian and
Estuarine Ecology of the Limitrophe Section of the Colorado River and Its Associated
Delta, Minute No. 306, (Dec. 12, 2000), available at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min306.pdf.
International Boundary and Water Commission, Partial Coverage of Allocation of the
Rio Grande Treaty Tributary Water Deficit from Fort Quitman to Falcon Dam,
Minute 307, (March 16, 2001), available at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min307.pdf.
International Boundary and Water Commission, United States Allocation of Rio Grande
Waters During the Last Year of the Current Cycle, Minute 308, (June 28, 2002),
available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute308.pdf.
International Law Association, Berlin Conference (2004): Water Resources Law.
Available at http://www.asil.org/ilib/WaterReport2004.pdf.
Kelly, Mary and Alberto Szekely. Modernizing the International Boundary and Water
Commission, Policy Paper No. 1,Univ. Of Calif. at Berkely Center for Latin American
Studies, (2004).
Khalid, Abu Raihan M. Interlinking Rivers Project in India and International Water
Law: An Overview, The Development. 3 Chinese Journal of International Law 553
(2004).
Marin, Carlos. Bi-National Border Water Supply Issues from the Perspective of the
IBWC, 11 U.S.-Mex. L.J. 36 (2003).
Mumme, Stephen. Innovation and Reform in Transboundary Resource Management: A
Critical Look at the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States
and Mexico, 33 Natural Resources Journal 93 (1993).
Mumme, Stephen. Managing Acute Water Scarcity on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 39 Nat.
Resources J. 149 (1999).
Mumme, Stephen. Minute 242 and Beyond: Challenges and Opportunities for Managing
Transboundary Groundwater on the Mexico-U.S. Border, 40 Nat. Resources Journal
341 (2000).
Mumme, Stephen. The Case for Adding an Ecology Minute to the 1944 United StatesMexico Water Treaty, 15 Tulane Environmental Law Journal, 239 (2001-2002).
Mumme, Stephen and Nicolas Pineda. Water Management on the U.S.-Mexico Border:

50

Mandate Challenges for Binational Institutions,(2001 presentation for The Future of
the U.S.-Mexico Border: Population, Development, Water, Environmental Change and
Security Program); available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1413&fuseaction=topics.documents&doc_id=19022
&group_id=15619.

Mumme, Stephen. Revising the 1944 Water Treaty: Reflections on the Rio Grande
Drought Crises and Other Matters, 45.4 Journal of the Southwest, 649 (2003).
Mumme, Stephen. Developing Treaty Compatible Watershed Management Reforms for
the U.S.-Mexico Border: The Case for Strengthening the International Boundary and
Water Commission, 30 North Carolina Journal of Int'l Law & Com. Reg., 929 (2005).
Mumme, Stephen. Advancing Binational Cooperation in Transboundary Aquifer
Management on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 16 Colorado Journal of International
Environmental Law & Policy, 83 (2005).
Mumme, Stephen. Improving Binational Water Management, Center for U.S.-Mexican
Studies, University of California, San Diego, 9 (ND) available at
http://usmex.ucsd.edu/research/conf_pdfs/mumme.pdf.
Sanchez, Roberto. Public Participation and the IBWC: Challenges and Options, 33
Natural Resources Journal 283 (1993).
Schmandt, Jurgen. Bi-National Water Issues in the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo Basin, 4 Water
Policy 135 (2002).
Treaty Regarding Utilization of Water of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219.
UN Doc. A/RES.51/869, 21 May 1997, 36 ILM 700 (1997).
U.S. Section, International Boundary and Water Commmission (IBWC), Strategic Plan:
Fiscal Years 2006-2011, (2006) available at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/FY06_Strategic_Plan.pdf.
Zorc, Eileen. The Border 2012 U.S.-Mexico Environmental Program: Will a Bottom-Up
Approach Work?, 16 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 533 (2004).

51

